One strand of the literature on endogenous growth concerns models in which public infrastructure a¤ects the private production process. A puzzle in this literature is that observed public investment-to-output ratios for developed economies tend to fall short of theoretical model-based optimal ratios. We reexamine the optimal choice of public investment in a more general and plausible framework, which allows for a gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, a lower depreciation rate for public capital than for private capital, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that di¤ers from unity and the need to …nance a non-trivial share of public services in output in each period. Given other fundamentals in the economy, we show that the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is smaller for low-growth economies, for economies populated by consumers with low preferences for substituting consumption intertemporally and when public capital is durable. Moreover, for a calibrated economy, we show that a combination of these factors solves the public investment puzzle.
Introduction
Early empirical work by Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) identi…ed the significant impact that public infrastructures have on economic growth. One strand of the literature on endogenous growth relating to models in which public investment a¤ects the private production process has been, in part, motivated by this empirical …nding. Barro's (1990) study represents an important breakthrough in characterizing the in ‡uence of public infrastructure on growth and welfare in an endogenous growth setting. Subsequent work by Futagami et al. (1993) , Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) , Cassou and Lasing (1998, 2004) , Turnovsky (1997) , Aschauer (2000) and Marrero and Novales (2005) are variations of Barro's research. In these studies, public revenues derive from proportional income taxes and the government decides the stable ratio of public investment to output.
Since 1960, the public sector has gradually become less important in the productive activity of most developed economies. While total public outlays have represented meaningful shares of GDP during the last four decades, public investment-to-output ratios have generally declined over the same period. 1 Nevertheless, this ratio has remained relatively stable since the 1990s. By 2000, public investment represented 3.7% of total real GDP in the OECD and 3.1% in the US. For a standard calibration, these …gures are well below the optimal public investment-to-output ratios predicted by most recent studies. This considerable di¤erence between current policies and most model-based optimal predictions suggests a public investment puzzle in the context of this literature.
These di¤erences support the thesis that the suboptimal public infrastructure policy over the last decades is to blame for the productivity slowdowns of the 1970s and 1980s (Aschauer, 1989, and Munnell, 1990 , among many others). However, in this context, by using a stylized one-sector endogenous growth model carefully calibrated for the post-war US economy, Cassou and Lansing (1998, 2004) and Marrero (2005) …nd that reduced public investment in the 1970s and 1980s accounted for only a small proportion of the productivity slowdown.
The goal of the paper is not to discuss the productivity slowdown, on which there is already an extensive literature. Rather, we revisit the optimal choice of public investment in a more general and plausible framework than those mentioned above. Our framework allows for i) long-lasting private and public capital stocks (Ai and Cassou, 1995, and Cassou and Lansing, 1998) , ii) a lower depreciation rate for public capital than for private capital (Ai and Cassou, 1995) , iii) an elasticity of intertemporal substitution below unity (as suggested by Prescott and others) and iv) assumes that there is a need to …nance a non-trivial proportion of public services in output in each period (Cassou and Lansing, 1998, and Marrero, 2005) . This economy allows for a gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, which Futagami et al. (1993) found to be an important factor in determining optimal public investment policy in a Barro-type framework. Futagami et al. (1993) did not explicitly derive an expression for the optimal stationary public investment policy. In this paper, we contribute to …lling this gap.
More concretely, the contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we obtain an implicit expression for the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio in a more general endogenous growth framework. 2 Second, we assess the importance of i)-iv) factors for optimal stationary policy. Third, we reconsider the public investment puzzle based on a calibrated economy within our new framework.
A carefully examination of the implicit policy expression gives an important insight into the size and determinants of the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio. We show that the optimal ratio is less than the growth-maximizing ratio. Whereas the public capital elasticity and the subjective discount rate positively a¤ect optimal public investment policy, as is well known (see, e.g., Barro, 1990 , and Glomm and Ravikumar, 1994), the factors mentioned above have a negative e¤ect on the optimal ratio, as we show. Moreover, the endogenous growth rate acts as an indirect channel through which the fundamentals of the economy may also a¤ect the optimal policy. In the …nal section, for a carefully calibrated economy, we show that the model-based optimal public investment-to-output ratio falls between 3% and 4% for the benchmark and similar calibrations. A wider sensitivity analysis reveals that all the new factors in the economy must be taken into account simultaneously to obtain this result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show the public investment puzzle within the context of existing studies. In Section 3, we describe the economic model. In Section 4, we discuss the optimal stationary policy and carry out a numerical illustration. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The public investment puzzle
First, we summarize the optimal stationary public investment policy predicted by existing studies. Next, we point out the existence of a puzzle in this literature. Under a standard model-based calibration, we identify a signi…cant di¤erence between these theoretical optimal ratios and the empirically observed ratios in developed economies by 2000.
The pioneering work of Barro (1990) treats the ‡ow of public infrastructure as an input into private production. The development of public infrastructure induces higher future returns to private investment, but also distorts private incentives to consume and save through higher taxes. Optimal policy equalizes the post-tax return of private capital and the return on public infrastructure. Barro obtained the wellknown result that the optimal share of output devoted to public investment equals the elasticity of public capital in the production function, . 3 Moreover, this optimal policy corresponds to the public investment ratio that maximizes growth.
In a similar dynamic framework, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) assume that the stock of public infrastructure is input into private production. Since public capital is productive in subsequent periods, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is , where , which is between zero and unity, is the subjective discount rate of the representative household. 4 In addition, if the government is constrained to …nance a constant share of output devoted to public services, 2 (0; 1), in each period, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is (1 ), as in Marrero and Novales (2005) . The negative e¤ect of a positive on the net return to public capital makes the optimal ratio lower than those described above.
For developed countries, public investment-to-output ratios have generally declined since 1960, but have been reasonably stable during the last decade. By 2000, this ratio was about 3.7% for OECD countries and about 3.1% for the US economy.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] For a standard calibration, Table 1 shows the optimal public investment-to-output ratios implied by above works. We assume that = 0:97 and = 0:18 (as in Cassou and Lansing, 1998) . Since there is debate about the calibration of the public capital elasticity, we consider a range of values for this parameter. For small values of , i.e., below 0.05, the model-based optimal ratios are close to current public investment ratios for the OECD and the US. Although some empirical papers (e.g., Holtz-Eaking, 1994, Hulten and Schwab, 1991, and Tatom, 1991) obtain estimates of that are close to zero, a recent consensus has developed that suggests that this elasticity is between 0.1 and 0.2 (see, e.g., Ai and Cassou, 1995 , Cassou and Lansing, 1998 , and Shioji, 2001 . Hence, either current public investment policies are suboptimal or existing models omit relevant factors and hence o¤er misleading policy prescriptions.
Related studies assume that public and private capital fully depreciate in one period, and the models reduce to the special case of an AK economy. Thus, they lack transitional dynamics. Moreover, to obtain analytical solutions, they assume a logarithmic utility function (i.e., that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity). Futagami et al. (1993) point out the importance of accounting for transitional dynamics on optimal policy design. Turnovsky (2004) emphasizes this issue in a non-scale economy that exhibits exogenous growth. In an economy with transitional dynamics, there is a trade-o¤ between consumption during the transition and long-run growth, which causes the optimal public investment-to-output to be lower than the growth-maximizing ratio. Indeed, assuming a log-linear accumulation rule for public capital and a logarithmic utility function, Cassou and Lansing (1998, 2004) …nd the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio to be
where g is the depreciation rate of public capital, which is between zero and unity. If public capital fully depreciates in one period, the economy lacks transitional dynamics and the optimal policy is as stated by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) . However, the smaller the depreciation rate, the slower are the transition dynamics and the more important is the welfare trade-o¤ referred to above. E¤ectively, for g < 1, the optimal ratio is always lower than . Nevertheless, for standard parameter values ( g = 0:1), the optimal ratio remains well above 4% when the public capital elasticity exceeds 0:05 (see Table 1 ).
In subsequent sections, we revisit the optimal choice of public investment under a more general and plausible framework that allows for a gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, and reconsider the public investment puzzle based on a calibrated economy within our new framework..
The economy
We consider a general one-sector economy incorporating a continuum of identical …rms, an in…nitely lived household and a government. The model is similar to those of Cassou and Lansing (1998) and Marrero and Novales (2005) , which incorporate durable capital and productive public expenditure. We also suppose that public capital depreciates at a slower rate than private capital, that the government is constrained to …nance a constant share of output devoted to public services in each period, and that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution may di¤er from unity. The population growth rate is assumed to be zero and population size is normalized to unity. All variables are expressed in per capita terms.
Firms
There is a single non-storable consumption good in the economy, y, which is produced with private capita stock, k, public capital, g, and labor, l. The household is the owner of the physical capital and …rms. There exists an index of knowledge available to each …rm, z, which augments the productive capacity of labor. 5 The individual technology is described by the production function,
wherel is e¤ective labor,l = zl, and f (1; 1; 1) = A 0 > 0 is a technological scale factor. We denote by t , t and t the elasticities of output with respect to k, g and l, respectively, at time t. This speci…cation is based on Ai and Cassou (1995) and Cassou and Lansing (1998).
Assumptions 1:
The function f ( ) is increasing, strictly concave, two times continuously di¤erentiable, homogenous of degree one and satis…es Inada conditions. Inputs are complementary, thus cross-derivatives are positive. All factors are essential in the production process. The average capital stock across …rms, K, is taken as a proxy for the knowledge index z available to each single …rm (Romer, 1986 ).
Remark 1:
By the Euler's theorem, linear homogeneity of f ( ) implies t + t + t = 1 for all t.
Because …rms are identical, K = k and per capita output is produced according to
We use F (t) and f (t) to denote F (k t ; l t ; g t ) and f k t ;l t ; g t , respectively. We use f k (t), F k (t) and f kk (t), F kk (t) to denote the …rst and second time derivatives of f ( ) and F ( ), respectively, with respect to k and so on of the indicated object, evaluated at a particular allocation.
Remark 2: F (t) = f (t) and f g (t) = F g (t) = t F (t) =g t for a particular allocation. However, since each …rm neglects its own contribution on the aggregate capital stock, F k (t) and f k (t) are not equal. More precisely, f k (t) = t F (t) =k t and F k (t) = ( t + t ) F (t) =k t .
The …rm' s problem [P1]
Since investment decisions are made by households, the …rm's problem is static. Firms demand k and l, while g and K are taken as exogenous variables. Each …rm pays the competitive-determined wage w on the labor it hires and the rate r on the capital it rents. Taking g and K as given, optimally leads to the usual marginal productivity conditions and the resultant …rm pro…ts, , every period:
where is the discount factor, between zero and one, c t is per capita consumption of the representative household at time t and u : R + ! R is the momentary utility function. The household is endowed with one unit of time. Since the household does not value leisure, this unit is supplied inelastically every period. We use u(t) to denote u(c t ), and u c (t) and u cc (t) to denote the …rst and second derivative at time-t of u(t) with respect to c. We will make use of the following functions: (t) = u c (t)=c t u cc (t), which is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at period t, andũ c (t + 1) = u c (t)=u c (t + 1), which denotes the marginal rate of substitution between next-period and current consumption. It is worth noting that both measures are inversely related.
Assumptions 2:
The function u( ) is increasing, strictly concave, two times continuously di¤erentiable and satis…es Inada conditions. The budget constraint faced by the household is
every period, is the linear depreciation rate of private capital and t is a tax rate applied to total income, which is determined outside of her control. 6 
The household' s problem [P2]
The representative household maximizes (6) subject to (7), c t > 0 and k t+1 > 0 and the transversality condition lim
that places a limit on the accumulation of private capital. The standard optimal consumption-saving decision is given by
Government
The government claims a constant proportion, , of output to fund public services,
which is taken as given. This assumption ensures that c g continues to represent a signi…cant and realistic share of economic output as the economy grows. 7 Public services do not contribute to either production or consumer welfare. In addition, public investment, i g , is also a proportion, x t , of output,
We assume that issuing debt is not allowed and a proportional tax on total income is the only way to …nance total public expenses,
The following laws of motion for private and public capital stocks complete the description of the economy:
where i is private investment, g is the linear depreciation rate of public capital, which 6 Since f ( ) is homogenous of degree one, from (3)- (5), we have that t (w t l t + k t r t + t ) = t y t . 7 Cassou and Lansing (1998), Marrero and Novales (2005) and Marrero (2005) , among others.
might be lower than that of private capital. 8 Given that ; g < 1, this speci…cation allows for durable private capital and generates transitional dynamics.
The optimal stationary policy
A feasible policy is a trio of non-negative and bounded sequences, = f t ; x t ; g 1 t=0 , with t = x t + 1 for all periods, t. A price system is a pair of non-negative and bounded sequences, q = fr t ; w t g 1 t=0 .
De…nition 1 A vector of sequences fc t ; c gt ; k t+1 ; g t+1 ; i t ; i gt ; l t ; y t ; r t ; w t g 1 t=0 constitutes a -competitive equilibrium if, given a feasible policy , a price system q and initial conditions k 0 ; g 0 > 0: i) fl t ; k t+1 g 1 t=0 solve the pro…t maximizing problem of the …rms [P1]; ii) fc t ; l t ; k t+1 g 1 t=0 solve the household's problem [P2]; iii) the technology constraints (2), (13), (14) hold and iv) markets clear every period,
De…nition 2 A balanced growth path (BGP) is a competitive equilibrium path along which per capita endogenous variables either stay constant or grow at a constant rate.
The following set of assumptions, given that cumulative inputs exhibit constant returns to scale in the aggregate ( t + t + t = 1 from Remark 1), guarantees the existence of a BGP in our economic model. 9 An overbar denotes variables on such an equilibrium path.
Assumptions 3: i) the policy is stationary, i.e., t = and x t = x; ii) lim k! k t = , lim k! k t = and lim k! k t = ; iii) lim k! kũc (t + 1) = u c , constant and positive; iv) the return of private and public capital must be invariable along the BGP, i.e., lim k! k f k (t) = r and lim k! k F g (t) = F g ; v) the return of private capital must be high enough, i.e., r >
.
Following Jones and Manuelli (1997) , conditions (i)-(iv) of Assumptions 3 ensure a constant growth rate of per capita variables on the BGP. Moreover, standard arguments imply that the paths for y, c, k, g, c g , which solve the -competitive equilibrium all grow at the same constant rate, . Finally, condition (v) guarantees that is positive. Although must be positive along the BGP, it cannot be su¢ ciently large to allow households to follow a chain-letter action; i.e., (8) 
which is a condition that must be satis…ed on the BGP.
Remark 5: On the BGP, u c = lim k! k u c (c t )=u c (c t (1 + )). Since u( ) is strictly concave and > 0, u c is directly related to . Indeed, for the standard CES function, u(c t ) = c
is inversely related to .
The Ramsey problem
There are many competitive equilibria and BGPs implied by di¤erent government policies. The following Ramsey problem chooses the -competitive allocation that maximizes (6) . The government is said to be benevolent because it sets …scal policy to maximize the welfare of the representative consumer, given the competitive equilibrium conditions of the household and …rms. The Lagrangian to this problem is as follows:
where the …rst constraint corresponds to the household's consumption-saving condition, the second represents the accumulation of public capital and the third is the global resource constraint of the economy.
This problem has the noteworthy feature that its solution is, in general, timeinconsistent. Nevertheless, several standard assumptions allow us to ignore the timeinconsistency problem. We could either assume that the government can credibly commit at time zero to future taxes, or we could restrict …scal policy to be stationary.
In either case, since we want to compare our solution with optimal stationary policies predicted by existing studies, we solve the Ramsey problem and focus on the optimal long-run, stationary public investment policy. Interior optimal conditions for this problem are shown in the Appendix.
Conditions (38)-(44) describe the optimal stationary policy on the BGP. Combining (38) and (41), the optimal stationary policy must satisfy the following condition:
The marginal rate of transformation between current output and available public capital -net of depreciation and discounted by the factor -must equalize the rate at which the household wishes to substitute current and future consumption. A high level of u c means that the household places little value on future consumption relative to current consumption. Thus, given other economic fundamentals and the proportion of total resources used by the government to fund public consumption, the optimal public investment policy should hardly crowd out current consumption, in which case, the public investment-to-output ratio should be low. The productivity of public capital is high in this case and the left-hand side of (19) equals the right-hand side. Similar reasoning applies to economies with low levels of u c .
In addition, given the equation for public capital accumulation (43), we have
Substituting (20) into (19) reveals that the optimal stationary public policy, x + and + , must be such that
For (21)- (22) to be conditions for an interior optimal stationary policy, the associated must be positive and must satisfy the transversality condition, (17), i.e.,
We focus on interior optimal policies. 10 The following proposition summarizes this important result under these circumstances: Proposition 3 Given Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and considering interior solutions, there exists a unique and positive stationary public investment-to-output ratio that solves (21) on the BGP. Proof.
Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the competitive equilibrium for any given feasible policy. Following a standard argument, this result derives from the theorem of the maximum, since the choice set is compact and the objective function is strictly concave and continuous. Assumptions 3 guarantees that the BGP has a constant and positive steady-state growth rate. Solving for the BGP equilibrium given the level of x in (21) yields a unique optimal stationary policy. Moreover, since u c > 1, > 0 and ; g < 1, this x is positive
In general, since and u c depend on fundamentals and policy parameters in a non-trivial manner, an explicit expression for the optimal stationary policy cannot be obtained. 11 The next two corollaries particularize condition (21) for speci…c environments. The unique environment in which an explicit expression for the optimal public investment ratio can be determined is described in the …rst corollary. The result in the second corollary is used to carry out the numerical exercise below.
Corollary 4
Assume that u(t) is consistent with u c = 1 + (i.e., u(t) = log c t and thus = 1). If g = 1, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is the standard (1 ).
Corollary 5 Assume that u(t) is the standard CES function, c
1 1= t 1 = (1 1= ), with > 0, where is constant for all periods t. The optimality condition (21) is then given by
Although, in general, we cannot obtain an explicit expression for x + , several important results arise from a careful examination of (21) . As a point of reference, we take the standard optimal ratio,
. From (21), it is easy to show that x + < (>) (1 ) whenever the following condition holds:
Since u c > 1 and ; g < 1, it is worth noting that the right-hand side term in (23) is higher that the right-hand side expression in (25) for any feasible level of u c ; ; g . Thus, in theory, x + might be above or below the threshold (1 ). The following proposition states this result in accordance with the relationship among the key variables , u c and g .
Proposition 6
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and considering interior solutions: i) if u c > 1 + , the optimal public investment-to-output ratio, x + , is lower than (1 ) for any level of g ; ii) if u c = 1+ and g < 1, x + is also below (1 ); iii) if u c = 1 + and g = 1, x + is equal to (1 ); iv) if u c < 1 + and g = 1, x + is higher than (1 ); v) …nally, if u c < 1 + and g < 1, the condition (25) must be checked to determine whether x + is greater than or less than (1 ).
Although the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio may exceed (1 ), it cannot do so by much. Indeed, the next proposition shows that the ratio cannot exceed (1 ) . This threshold is the ratio that maximizes the steadystate growth rate in the related model of Marrero and Novales (2005) , in which is positive.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and considering interior solutions, the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio is less than (1 ). Proof. Rewrite the optimal public investment-to-output ratio as (1 g)
The second term in this expression is less than unity, given (17) and, therefore,
In an economy in which consumers place little value on current consumption in terms of future consumption, a benevolent government sets a high level of x + , generally above
(1 ) and close to the level that maximizes growth, (1 ). As a consequence, the resulting di¤erence between economic growth and the marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption would be large. However, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio does not exceed the ratio that maximizes growth, because under this policy there would be less consumption and growth on the BGP. On the other hand, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio would be well below (1 ) and the resulting di¤erence between and u c would be small. In short, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio would be smaller for low-growth economies, economies populated by consumers with low preferences for substituting consumption intertemporally and with long-lasting public infrastructures.
Direct and indirect e¤ects on the optimal policy
From (21), it is clear that the following fundamentals of the economy directly a¤ect optimal public investment policy: ; ; , g and u c -or from Remark 5. While the e¤ects on x + of , , g and are positive, that of on x + is negative. The intuition behind these relationships is straightforward. A lower discount factor, , and a smaller marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption means that households have a higher preference for current consumption relative to future consumption. On the other hand, a lower depreciation rate implies slower transition dynamics. Since < 1, the future (i.e., the long run) is less important than the short run for aggregate welfare under these circumstances. Lastly, is positively related to the rate of return on public capital, while a higher implies that a higher proportion of output must be …nanced by distortionary taxes, which reduces the return to private investment. In addition, changes in these fundamentals might have indirect e¤ects on the optimal policy through their e¤ects on the endogenous growth rate. Indeed, the private capital depreciation rate can only a¤ect the optimal policy through this channel. The total e¤ect of all the other factors on the optimal policy is the sum of the direct and indirect e¤ects. For a calibrated economy, we evaluate these e¤ects in the next section. We show that the strength of the indirect e¤ects depends largely on the depreciation rate of public capital and on households' preferences between present and future consumption. For instance, if 1= u c = 1 + , in which case, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity, and if public capital fully depreciates in one period, the optimal public investment ratio is (1 ), and there is no indirect e¤ect.
A numerical illustration
We proceed next to look at numerical solutions for a calibrated economy that resembles some steady-state characteristics of the US postwar economy. We assume particular functional form of u( ) and f ( ) and assign values to parameters in order to illustrate the relationship between the optimal stationary policy and the fundamentals of the economy.
We specify the per-period utility function of the CES class as
Meanwhile, the production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas function with public and private capital, a spillover factor and constant returns to scale in all factors productivity,
For these particular functions, the solution of the system (29), (30) and (24) gives the steady-state value of the public capital to private capital ratio, g= k, the economic growth rate and the optimal stationary policy
Condition (29) comes from combining (42) and (43), while (30) is the particularization to (43). From (29)- (30), it is easy to show that steady-state growth is maximized setting the standard x = (1 ).
Values of the parameters
The parametrization of the baseline economy is standard. The time unit is the natural year. Based on King et al. (1988) and many others, we choose = 0:58, the labor elasticity in the Cobb-Douglas technology. We use = 0:5, as considered by Prescott and others. For depreciation rates, we take those levels estimated by Ai and Cassou (1995): = 0:094 and g = 0:038. The value = 0:18 implies that the government spending on nonproductive goods and services is 18% of output, which is consistent with its post-war average. Since the elasticity of public capital is the most controversial parameter to assign an unquestionable value, a range of values will be examined. 12 For the benchmark economy, however, is chosen together with A 0 and to match a steady-state per capita growth rate of 2:9%, to reproduce a public to private capital ratio of 0:55 with x = 0:052 and an after-tax interest rate of 6.9%, 13 which are consistent with their levels in the 60s for the U.S. economy. Finally, recall that , and are not independent, since + + = 1.
For our model economy, the baseline calibration sets the private investment-tooutput ratio to a little under 18%, the share of output that is devoted to private consumption to be about 60% and total public receipts as a percentage of output 12 For instance, Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) estimate very high values of , equal to 0.39 and 0.34, respectively. Lynde and Richmond (1992) and Ai and Cassou (1995) account for non-stationarity in the data and estimations are smaller but still signi…cant: the former estimates = 0:2 using time series techniques, while the latter estimates ' between 0.15 and 0.2, using a GMM estimation process. In a more recent paper, Shioji (2001) uses dynamic pannel techniques and estimate the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure to be somewhere around 0.1 and 0.15. On the other hand, papers by Holtz-Eaking (1994), Hulten and Schwab (1991) and Tatom (1991) , among others, put that estimation very close to zero. Sturm et al. (1997) show a selective review of these empirical studies.
13 See Cooley and Prescott (1995) . Introducing privately issued real bonds into the consumer budget constraint, the optimally condition for bonds leads to 1 + r = exp ( ln ). We calibrate by setting r = 0:069 and = 0029 in this expression.
to be a little under 25%. These ratios are common for the post-war U.S. and other develop economies.
We report the values of the parameters for the baseline economy in Table 1 . Notice that = 0:093 -similar to that estimated by Shioji (2001) -and the resultant value of is 0:327, similar to the capital share used in the literature.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Simulation results
We …rst show the quantitative properties of the baseline economy. Then, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the following important parameters: the elasticity of public capital, ; the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ; the share of output devoted to public services, ; and the public and private capital depreciation rates, g and . The sensitivity analysis facilitates understanding of the determinants of the optimal stationary policy and of the level of the optimal investment-to-output ratio. In general, the numerical exercise helps solve the public investment puzzle described in Section 2.
For each parameterization, we solve the system (29), (30) and (24) numerically. We limit the sensitivity analysis to parameterizations that generate interior optimal policy solutions (i.e., condition (23) must be satis…ed). Table 2 reports the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio under alternative parameterizations. The table is divided into blocks, one for each parameter. The …rst row of each block shows the optimal policy for the associated parameterization. The second row reports the public investment ratio that is consistent with a constant growth rate. They may di¤er each other because of the indirect e¤ect.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The …rst column in the table reports the optimal stationary policy for the baseline economy. This implies that public investment must be 3:94% of real output. It is worth noting that the optimal ratio is between 3% and 4% for minor changes in all important parameters. For the baseline economy, the optimal ratio is substantially less than the standard (1 ) = 7:4%. The associated growth rate is 2:8% and the marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption is 1:057. Thus, for the baseline economy, 1 + is evidently lower than u c . All these results are consistent with Proposition 6.
Other important macro ratios under the optimal policy are: c=y = 61:1%, i k =y = 17% and g=k = 43%. With respect to the baseline economy, the public sector turns out to be less important for private production, and the public to private capital ratio has fallen from 55% to 43%. On the other hand, private consumption and private investment represent a greater shares of output. These features are consistent with the macroeconomic trends in developed economies during recent decades (see Section 2) .
For the baseline economy, it is worth noting that the optimal public investment-tooutput ratio is very similar to the average ratio in OECD countries and slightly above the ratio for the US, based on data for 2000 (see Table 1 ). Hence, economic elements may explain the public investment puzzle described in Section 2. Moreover, our results indicate that all elements combine to generate an optimal public investment-to-output ratio of between 3% and 4% under a realistic calibration.
The e¤ect of and on the optimal policy is clearly positive from (24), as in existing studies. We focus on the new e¤ects of g , , and . The optimal ratio rises with the public capital depreciation rate. Moreover, x + approaches (1 ) and (1 ) if public capital fully depreciates in one period. In principle, a su¢ ciently low g is needed to achieve a level of x + below 4% for a reasonable calibration of the economy. However, this condition is not su¢ cient. In addition, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution must be less than unity. Indeed, using the benchmark level of g , the optimal ratio is 5:62 and just below (1 ) for = 1 and = 1:625, respectively. In addition, must be higher than about 0:15 for the optimal ratio being less than 4%. For instance, if = 0, and all other parameters are unchanged, the optimal ratio is about 5%.
The overall e¤ects of g and on the optimal policy are mainly direct e¤ects, similarly to the e¤ect of public capital elasticity. On the other hand, the indirect e¤ect predominates in the overall e¤ect of a change in , especially when di¤ers greatly from unity. The e¤ect of is completely indirect.
In short, in our economic model, a public consumption-to-output ratio of above about 0:15, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of less than unity, a public capital elasticity of below about 0:15 and a depreciation rate of capital of less than 0:125 are necessary for the optimal public investment-to-output ratio to be less than 4%. Parameter values in these ranges are commonly used in studies of economic growth in developed economies.
Final remarks
We have revisited the optimal choice of public investment in a more general and plausible framework than those considered by most earlier papers in the endogenous growth literature. The following key elements are combined in a standard dynamic setting that incorporates public capital: (i) public and private capital are durable, which allows for a gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, (ii) public capital depreciates at a lower rate than private capital, (iii) the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than unity, (iv) a signi…cant proportion of output is devoted to public services. Each of these factors were shown to play an important role in the optimal policy design proposed in earlier studies. In this context, a general condition for optimal public investment policy was derived. This condition depends on the endogenous growth rate and an explicit expression for the optimal policy is unobtainable. Nevertheless, careful examination of the implicit condition reveals important …ndings.
The optimal public investment-to-output ratio is less than the ratio that maximizes growth. We showed that the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is smaller for low-growth economies and for economies populated by consumers with low preferences for substituting consumption intertemporally. In general, given the fundamentals of the economy, a developed country with an initial high growth rate tends to stabilize its growth rate. In ‡ation and interest rates tend to fall and the …nancial sector becomes more competitive and e¢ cient. Low interest rates and the development of ‡exible …nancial and credit markets tend to reduce the marginal rate to intertemporal substitution of consumption. Our …ndings suggest that this trend should be accompanied by an optimal strategy that reduces the share of output devoted to public investment. This pattern is consistent with recent trends in most developed economies.
The public capital elasticity and the discount factor in the utility function are two important determinants of the optimal policy, as earlier papers have already shown. The negative e¤ect of the share of output devoted to public consumption is worth noting. Finally, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the public capital depreciation rate have positive and important e¤ects on the optimal public investment-to-output ratio. In addition to a¤ecting the optimal ratio directly, these parameters may also a¤ect the optimal policy indirectly through the endogenous growth rate. This indirect channel is particularly important for measuring the overall e¤ect of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the e¤ect of the private capital depreciation rate. For other parameters, the total e¤ect is dominated by the direct e¤ect.
Finally, we used a calibrated economy to estimate the optimal public investmentto-output ratio and to resolve an existing puzzle in the public investment literature. This puzzle is that current public investment-to-output ratios of about 3% or 4% for developed economies are well below the optimal ratios predicted by most earlier theoretical models. For our calibrated economy, we showed that each of the model's elements contribute to generating optimal public investment-to-output ratios of less than 4%.
Appendix: Optimal conditions
The existence and uniqueness of a solution to the Ramsey problem is guaranteed by Assumptions 1 to 3. This result derives from the theorem of the maximum, since the choice set in this problem is compact and the objective function is strictly concave and continuous. 14 We de…ne the following ratios:~ 3t = 3t =u c (t),~ 2t = 2t =u c (t),~ 1t = 1t =k t+1 andũ c (t) = u c (t)=u c (t + 1). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is denoted by t = u c (t)=c t u cc (t). We use that l t = 1 every period. Using these de…nitions, optimal conditions for t > 0 of the Ramsey problem (18) 
2t : g t+1 ( t+1 ) F (t) (1 g )g t = 0;
3t : c t + k t+1 (1 )k t (1 t )F (t) = 0:
On the BGP, aggregate variables y; c; k and k g grow at the constant rate , while~ 1 ,~ 2 ,~ 3 ,ũ c , and the tax rate must be constant. We omit the subindex t along such equilibrium path in what follows. Linear homogeneity of f ( ) implies lim k! k @f k ( ) @g k = F g and lim k! k k @f k ( ) @k = F k f k . On the BGP, conditions (31)- (37) 14 See Glomm and Ravikumar (1999) for a detailed discussion of existence and uniqueness in a similar framework. 15 The time-inconsistency problem appears because the optimal condition of a time-variant tax rate might be di¤erent for t = 0 than for t > 0. We focus on stationary policies and on steady-state conditions, so we do not concern about this problem. 
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